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INTRODUCTION
The Greater Antilles, and in particular the island of Hispaniola, was the epicenter of the most transformative global event in recorded human history when the old and new worlds encountered each other in 1492, initiating the Columbian exchange. 1 Over 500 years later, the Dominican Republic is again the locus of a global collision, the meeting of two seemingly disparate aspects of globalization: the international convergence of values 2 regarding preservation of maritime heritage and the inexorable privatization of state responsibilities for managing it and other resources. 3 These global trends have facilitated treasure hunters from more developed nations like the United States in convincing the Dominican Republic's resource managers to permit commercial salvage of Dominican submerged cultural patrimony in spite of the harmful environmental and long-term economic impacts, and in disregard of the Dominican government's conservationist laws and policies. 4 Allowing such salvage is a departure from the international community's emerging practice of preservation of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (UCH) as reflected in the international cooperation on protecting it through becoming a party to the 2001 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention for the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001 Convention), 5 or using its Annex as a "best practices" guide. 6 Furthermore, the trend in private international law toward recognizing the importance of conservation and preservation also calls into question the validity of continuing to engage in treasure hunting even under the auspices of traditional maritime salvage law. 7 While there are both international agreements and domestic laws in place available to protect and preserve UCH off the coast of the Dominican Republic, the actual practice sees management responsibility being delegated to privately run treasure-hunting 1. This could be a shipwreck, submerged city, or any other artifact or human remain found underwater. As most UCH at risk in Dominican waters are Spanish and other European Colonial shipwrecks or pre-Columbian artifacts, the controversy over an appropriate temporal cutoff (i.e., at what age does an artifact become "historical") is not at issue. However, in contrast to the 2001 Convention's definition, I address only culturally and historically significant UCH in recognition that the solution I propose (or any realistic solution) cannot possibly provide for management of all UCH, and must be limited to significant sites.
6. The Society for Historical Archaeology, the largest scholarly group concerned with the archaeology of the modern world (1400 AD-present), and the World Archaeological Congress (the only elected international body of practicing archaeologists) collectively represent the global professional archaeological community, and both support ratifying the 2001 Convention. MARGARET LESHIKAR-DENTON, 2012 YEAR-END REPORT OF THE SHA UNESCO COMMITTEE 1 (2012) (on file with author) ("The Committee supports the international ratification and implementation of the 2001 UNESCO Convention, and the adoption of its Annex as a 'best practices' document, even where ratification is unlikely; places emphasis on facilitating training opportunities and public awareness; facilitates NGO accreditation for SHA with the Meeting of States Parties; and monitors development of the Operational Guidelines."); see also Press Release, World Archaeological Cong., Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention Needs to be Implemented (July 14, 2008) , available at http://www. worldarchaeologicalcongress.org/site/wacpress_20.php.
7. Even Professor David Bederman, a notable admiralty law scholar and proponent of using salvage law to manage UCH, argues that "historic preservation values have been merged with 'traditional' salvage law [,] " at least in the implementation of admiralty law in the U.S. court system. companies for promises of short-term economic gain. 8 This Note suggests that instead of succumbing to this harmful aspect of the global privatization and horizontal delegation trend, the Dominican government should respond to its administrative and financial challenges by authorizing a management framework that allocates responsibilities among domestic and foreign state and nonstate actors through a variant of Common-Pool Resource Management known as Living Museums in the Sea. This strategy is consistent with existing Dominican laws and the emerging international preservation consensus, and could also relieve the economic pressures that forced the Dominican government to privatize its UCH management in the first place. Furthermore, it provides the potential for larger, more equitable, and longer-lasting economic benefits than treasure hunting while also preserving the UCH for present and future generations.
THE PROBLEM: TREASURE HUNTING OF SUBMERGED ARTIFACTS DESTROYS CULTURAL PATRIMONY AND THE FRAGILE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
The ever-increasing pace of artifact discovery and the rapid degradation of the ocean environment necessitate disincentivizing developing countries like the Dominican Republic from selling or privatizing the management of their submerged cultural patrimonies. 9 Treasure hunters prey on lesser-developed countries that permit 9. Although there is ongoing debate between the archaeological and commercial salvage (i.e., treasure hunter) camps about whether "commercial archaeology" (the excavation and sale of artifacts for profit) can be done in a way that preserves the historical and environmental integrity of the sites, I, in addition to many scholars, environmental and archaeological managers, and government officials, fundamentally disagree. See George F. Bass, After the Diving is Over, 1990 UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY PROC. FROM SOC'Y FOR HIST. ARCHAEOLOGY CONF. 10, 10-12 (explaining that good archaeological technique does not equal good archaeology); see also George F. Bass, The Development of Maritime Archaeology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MARITIME ARCHAEOLOGY 11-14 (Alexis Catsambis et al. eds., 2011) (explaining the fundamental incompatibility of archaeology and treasure hunting). Furthermore, I have a more fundamental problem with the for-profit excavation and sale of artifacts from an extremely fragile marine environment such as in the Dominican Republic. But see generally Underwater Cultural Heritage & UNESCO in New Orleans: An Introduction, ODYSSEY PAPERS NO. 13 (Odyssey Marine Exploration), 2010, available at http://www. shipwreck.net/pdf/OMEPapers13-UNESCO.pdf, for the perspective of the commercial treasure salvage industry. This article does not take issue with cultural resource management firms, such as those organized under the American Cultural Resources Association (http://www.acra-crm.org), which have a long history of conducting competent and ethical excavation for profit, but only the commercial exploitation of artifacts.
treasure hunting in a desperate attempt to exert some kind of control over the exploitation of their heritage. Treasure hunters "entice governments with promises of sure profits, but the overall result has been the destruction of LAC [Latin American and Caribbean] heritage sites and no sign of [long-term] financial reward for participating countries." 10 Not only do the proceeds from treasuring hunting fail to "provide vast sums to local coffers," 11 but this unscientific salvage of UCH also destroys what would otherwise be its sustainable value as an educational tool or tourist attraction. 12 Artifacts have only one chance to be properly excavated, and following correct excavation protocol is impossible for companies beholden to shareholders and working toward a singular goal: recovering investments through the discovery of treasure. 13 On top of this loss of cultural patrimony and historical data, the profit-driven treasure salvage industry inevitably causes the destruction of resources invaluable to the ecosystem around the shipwreck sites, harming threatened or endangered marine life dependent on these sites where shipwrecks have been integrated into the environment. 14 10. Leshikar & ATMOSPHERIC ASS'N, SUPPLEMENT TO FINAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY  ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE FINAL MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR  THE FLORIDA KEYS NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARY: COMMERCIAL TREASURE SALVORS  ( 1997) , available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/060197_rfa_keys_salvors.pdf (providing a detailed economic impact analysis of the treasure salvage industry in Florida). The paper concludes that the treasure hunting enterprises are "high risk speculative" gambles in which few companies make a profit. Id. at 27. It also states that in balance, the potential benefits to tourism from in situ preservation of submerged cultural resources outweighs the relatively minor economic impact on commercial treasure salvors resulting from sanctuary regulations. Within the United States, a full spectrum of laws and management regimes preserves natural and cultural heritage through a number of strategies, including banning the application of the law of salvage and finds and contract salvage, prohibiting uncontrolled treasure hunting, and regulating commercial salvage or recovery in accordance with professional archaeological standards. 15 As the laws and policies of the United States and other more developed nations severely restrict treasure hunting and make commercial salvage less profitable in those places, the lesser-developed countries become more viable alternatives. These countries therefore risk creating additional cultural and natural resource inequalities with the global "north" if they privatize already vulnerable regulatory institutions, 16 much as they suffered tremendous income disparities at the turn of the twenty-first century due to the same phenomena. 17 Yet, despite the considerable drawbacks of treasure hunting, the short-term financial incentives of being one of the few 16. Cf. Vadi, supra note 7, at 898. Vadi recommends using a form of privatized management of UCH called the "smart salvage" approach, which entails giving salvors the opportunity to cooperate in the management of UCH after its recovery and share subsequent revenues (from tourism or museum admissions) with the state for a period of time. I agree with her assertion that "states should not be considered owners but rather guardians or custodians of these cultural goods," and that her recommendations are an improvement over traditional salvage law, which rewards salvors for "rescuing" (i.e., looting) historic wrecks, often with "a generous percentage of the value of the salvaged vessel or part of the proceedings from the sale or auction of recovered treasures and artifacts." See id. at 867-69, 898 (explaining principles of salvage under maritime law). However, her recommendation perpetuates the unethical commercialization of artifacts by legitimizing profit-driven excavation activities. Moreover, it is particularly inappropriate to the Dominican context due to pervasive corruption. See CARL MEACHAM, CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: BECOMING A ONE-PARTY STATE?
At VI (2013) ("The history of corruption and poor rule of law in the Dominican Republic is long-many even refer to a 'culture of corruption' that characterizes the country's political system. But however storied the country's experience with corruption may be, it cannot be denied that the problem has grown-and quickly-in recent years.").
17. See Nancy Birdsall, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Remarks at Overseas Development Council Conference, Making Globalization Work: Globalization and the Developing Countries: The Inequality Risk (Mar. 18, 1999), available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/alumni/reunion99/birdsall.htm.
remaining treasure-hunter friendly regimes, 18 combined with the lack of resources to manage its own submerged cultural heritage, compel the Dominican government to allow foreign treasure-hunting companies to contract out excavation on swaths of its coastline in return for a relatively paltry fee and a fifty-fifty split of the recovered artifacts. 19 Nevertheless, this same government clearly recognizes the emerging international consensus around the treatment of UCH; in 2011, the Dominican Republic hosted a national consultation meeting for the 2001 Convention, a treaty that expressly prohibits the practice of uncontrolled treasure hunting. 20 The Janus-faced nature of globalization-simultaneously causing increased privatization of government responsibilities and harmonization of values, in concert with the unique character of UCH as a cultural and often also natural resource 21 -thus poses complex problems for conservationists, policymakers, and advocates for justice in developing countries. The challenge for any nation, particularly a lesserdeveloped one, is how to responsibly manage a resource that involves a multitude of local, national, and global stakeholders with limited human and financial resources and technical expertise. The global harmonization of laws at the domestic level is typically described as the phenomenon of states incorporating the legislation to implement treaties or conventions agreed to by nations under the auspices of international organizations. For example, states may implement domestic laws in agreement with the International Maritime Organization's uniform rules on safety in navigation and protecting the marine environment from international shipping, or the World Trade Organization's uniform rules on trade. 28 The current situation of UCH management on a global scale illustrates this type of harmonization emanating from an agreement among nations on the minimum standards and requirements they will hold themselves and persons subject to their jurisdiction to through implementing domestic statutes and regulations.
A. The 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage
The United Nations' International Law Commission's first note of UCH is found in a 1956 preparatory report for the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), which noted that UCH was not a natural resource of the Continental Shelf and thus there were no rights of coastal state jurisdiction over UCH on the Continental Shelf. 29 While the treatment of UCH was not addressed in any of the 1958 Conventions resulting from UNCLOS I, the issue was addressed in articles 149 and 303 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) that represented the culmination of UNCLOS III. 30 The negotiators recognized that this framework did not adequately address the issue, evidenced by article 303(4)'s contemplation of a convention that would specifically address objects of a historical or archaeological interest found at sea. 31 In 1987, the commercial salvage of artifacts from the Titanic wreck site awakened the world to the fact 40. See 2001 Convention, supra note 5, art. 2 ("States Parties shall, individually or jointly as appropriate, take all appropriate measures in conformity with this Convention and with international law that are necessary to protect underwater cultural heritage, using for this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities."); see also id. art. 7, 10, 12 (discussing treatment of UCH in internal waters, archipelagic waters and in the territorial sea; in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf; and in the Area, respectively). treatment of UCH 41 and explicitly rejecting the commercial exploitation of UCH. 42 Perhaps because of the existing international recognition of archaeological standards such as the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) Charter of 1996, the Annex to the Convention laying out the rules for activities directed at UCH has proven to be the instrument's most influential aspect. Not only has the academic archaeological community worldwide wholeheartedly adopted the Annex, 43 "the Annex was unanimously adopted by all Member States, even by those countries which have no intention of ratifying the Convention." 44 Concededly, the 2001 Convention remains a controversial instrument to a few major maritime powers such as Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 45 It nonetheless must be recognized as 47 Moreover, the concerns of the major maritime powers (particularly the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia) to the protections of UCH enshrined in the 2001 Convention have been limited to issues of so-called "creeping" coastal state jurisdiction and the treatment of sunken warships rather than to the actual concept of limiting the commercial exploitation of UCH. 48 The United States supports the overall goal and concept of protecting UCH by prohibiting its commercial exploitation, preferring in situ preservation and requiring that archaeological standards be applied when it is determined that recovery is necessary or appropriate. 49 As 
B. Some Notable Domestic Laws and Private Party Protections for UCH
The domestic legislation of nations host to significant UCH or treasure-hunting companies (or both), yet not party to the 2001 Convention, also evidences the materialization of an overall respect for the extra-monetary importance of UCH. Although home to the majority of treasure-hunting companies, 50 protections for UCH within U.S. state and national territorial waters, and to some extent out onto the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf, 51 are so restrictive that many would-be treasure hunters are deterred from operating in their home country. 52 The U.S. government initially hindered-but did not strike a fatal blow-to the treasure-hunting industry with the 1987 Abandoned Shipwreck Act (ASA). 53 The ASA was passed in light of mounting (Oct. 29, 2001) evidence that increasing numbers of people were not only visiting shipwrecks, but were also removing artifacts and thus irreparably damaging the archaeological record and causing the loss of U.S. and human history. 54 Under the Act, the U.S. government asserted title to any abandoned shipwreck "(1) embedded in submerged lands of a State; (2) embedded in coralline formations protected by a State on submerged lands of a State; or (3) on submerged lands of a State and is included in or determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register," 55 then transferred title of said wrecks "to the State in or on whose submerged lands the shipwreck[s are] located." 56 It is important to note that although the text of the Act mandates that states "manage" shipwreck resources and develop protective policies with which to do so, the ASA also requires states to develop policies that "allow for appropriate public and private sector recovery of shipwrecks consistent with the protection of historical values and environmental integrity of the shipwrecks and the sites." 57 While commercial exploitation is in direct conflict with the 2001 Convention, the ASA provides for the participation of private commercial companies in protecting shipwrecks in a way that is consistent with the 2001 Convention, 58 provided the company's activities are consistent with the Convention and its Annex Rules.
The Sunken Military Craft Act (SMCA) is another U.S. law that makes it difficult to treasure hunt in the United States and pushes U.S. treasure hunters to seek more favorable conditions in the lands and waters of lesser-developed nations. 59 The SMCA was passed with the intent of "protect [ 62 Whether the SMCA is actually so expansive may be further clarified in the implementing regulations, which have been proposed but not published in final version at the time of the writing of this Note. 63 The U.S. judicial system, though traditionally a stalwart defender of individual property rights under the U.S. Constitution, has also shown remarkable concern for preserving the archaeological integrity of the UCH (particularly shipwrecks), even when state protections through the ASA or other federal cultural protection laws are not applicable. 64 The company Sea Hunt brought an in rem action against two Spanish frigates-the Juno and La Galga-in order to solidify its salvage rights. Even though Sea Hunt obtained the proper permits from the State of Virginia 65 (in whose waters the wrecks lay) to conduct salvage, the Fourth Circuit held that Spain had not abandoned the shipwrecks, 66 and that since they were still owned by Spain and subject to sovereign immunity, Spain had the right to deny any salvage or award. 67 The court also pointed to Spain's "wishes to maintain [La Galga] as a sacred military gravesite" as reason why "a finding of implied abandonment would be improper." 68 As Virginia lacked the authority to issue a permit for salvage in the first place due to the finding of non-abandonment, Sea Hunt may be argued to be an admonition to the State of Virginia and other states that work with treasure hunters as well as to treasure hunters themselves. U.S. treasure-hunting companies also suffered notable setbacks after the extensive litigation surrounding the Titanic and Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes cases, even though these shipwrecks lay outside of U.S. territorial waters. 69 Professor James A. R. Nafziger asserts that the Titanic and Sea Hunt cases are evidence of the "development of a more cosmopolitan approach" that seeks "to apply the jus gentium and conventional international law more credibly and responsibly." 70 arguably accepted the terms of the Annex Rules as a matter of custom." 72 Yet, as enlightened as these recent developments in U.S. jurisprudence may appear, they do not provide reliable protection to UCH outside of the United States, particularly for UCH located within the coastal state jurisdiction of nations in the global south that may ignore these precedents and apply their own laws. Notably, the Mercedes case involved claims of ownership and sovereign immunity by Spain, the complaints of Peru who also claimed ownership of the UCH, 73 and the assertions of ownership by the salvor, all being appropriately dismissed by the Eleventh Circuit as a private salvor should not be able to put a U.S. Admiralty Judge in the position of resolving a dispute between Spain and Peru merely because the in rem action was filed in the United States. 74 The lower court (whose decision was upheld by the Eleventh Circuit) correctly found that the dispute was more appropriately addressed in Spain because the Mercedes was a Spanish warship; 75 ordered the return of all of the silver, gold, and other artifacts to Spain; 76 and ultimately ordered the salvor to pay over $1,000,000 of Spain's legal fees. 77 The United Kingdom, Australia, and Norway (among others) have also extended protections to UCH within their maritime zones through domestic legislation in accordance with the emerging international norms without becoming party to the As the current state of UCH management in the Dominican Republic illustrates, converging norms are not the only, nor even the dominant, attribute of the globalized world. The increasing importance of nonstate actors, which can "avoid political regulation and substitute themselves as new regulators of behavior" as well as attack "the monopoly of legitimate governance authority asserted through the state," has come to characterize the globalized present political reality even more than the emergence of a global consensus on governance. 85 Moreover, when values converge among developed nations, this can further incentivize developing economies to deviate from the norm to create economic leveraging power. These dual pressures have played out in a particularly interesting way in the Dominican Republic, resulting in a complete misalignment of the country's officially stated goals and actual practice.
A. A Brief History of Dominican Laws Regulating UCH
From a purely legislative perspective, the Dominican Republic appears to have a strong, state-centric legal regime protecting its wealth of UCH that stretches back to the beginning of the last century. Decree No. 4347 of 1903 declared archaeological objects the property of the state and forbade their removal from the Dominican Republic. 86 Ironically, given the current state of affairs, the statement of purpose for this decree bemoaned the fact that so many artifacts had already been taken from the country to "enrich foreign museums." 87 The Commission for the Conservation of Monuments, Works, and Pieces of Historical, Artistic or Archaeological Importance was created in 1932 to nominate and take measures to protect these sites. 88 could do anything to affect these sites without the permission of the commission, and no one could transport out of the country any of the nominated artifacts without the permission of Congress. 89 The Dominican Archaeological Commission was created the following year, yet only given advisory powers. 90 The next significant law relating to archaeology was passed as part of the sweeping Law No. 318 on the Cultural Heritage of the Nation during the repressive "Twelve Years" of President Joaquín Balaguer's autocratic rule. 91 This law opened the door to the command, control, and cash in model in operation today. Law No. 318 forced owners of valuable cultural property (including artifacts) to declare them to the state; prohibited the removal of this property (even when it was private property) from the country except for limited exhibition and with governmental consent; and prohibited archaeological excavations (including in submerged sites) except with the permission of the State Secretariat for Education, Fine Art and Worship. 92 However, this same secretariat could allow foreign "scientific bodies or institutions" and other qualified persons to excavate. 93 Balaguer created the Office of Cultural Patrimony and gave it power over archaeological excavations (and essentially everything else detailed in the Law No. 318) the following year. 94 Underwater Cultural Patrimony to grant third-party concessions to assist with its mission. 101 Treasure hunters have been successful in obtaining contracts for commercial salvage that appear to go well beyond the intent of this provision to provide the Dominican government some discretion in working with the private sector. These contracts instead result in the exploitation of UCH that circumvents the underlying purpose of the Act. 102 In addition to its domestic legislation, the Dominican government has also consistently tried to portray itself as a team player on international cultural protection issues and officially concurs with the mainstream international consensus on the protection of artifacts. It adheres to both Hague Conventions for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, and it approved and ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. 103 The Dominican Republic was also elected to UNESCO's executive board in November 2013. 104 Despite these internationalist overtures, the Dominican Republic's most recent move to exert more control over its UCH came in the form of the 2007 passage of Act No. 66/07, in which the Dominican Republic declared itself an archipelagic state, expanded its territorial sea from six to twelve nautical miles (nm), and proclaimed a twenty-four nm 101. Decreto No. 289-99, supra note 99, at art. 5-6 (stating that the powers of the Office include the following: "execute its program of study, salvage, conservation, and enhancement of artifacts through third-party concessions") (author's translation).
102. See id. art. 2(b) (describing that the law intended to ban searches aimed solely at treasure hunting: "Search, investigation and intervention of this heritage should be performed only by specialists with scientific objectives and through programs of mutual cooperation among States, excluding all intervention of a purely pecuniary or commercial nature.") (author's translation). contiguous zone and a 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 105 Article 16 of the Act specifically addresses UCH, both establishing a statutory body known as the National Maritime Authority "whose main function is to oversee the research, conservation, and exploitation of living and nonliving resources of the sea, seabed, and subsoil," and declaring as a national priority the preparation of "a register of the living and non-living, renewable and non-renewable resources of the superjacent waters, seabed and subsoil in the exclusive economic zone, as well as salvage operations with respect to treasures from ancient sunken vessels within the exclusive economic zone which constitute part of the national cultural heritage." 106 squarely under the control of the Secretary of State of Culture, so it is noteworthy that the Dominican government would create a new oversight body for historic wreck salvage. 110 Although this archipelagic legislation may signal a shift in how the Dominican government seeks to assert jurisdiction over its UCH-as a natural as well as a cultural resource, or as a proxy for claiming other seabed resources or expanded maritime territory 111 -the DGPCS (still under the control of the Ministry of Culture) continues to be the permit-issuing entity for the time being. 112 Scholar Sophia Kopela argues that the Dominican government's archipelagic expansion, combined with the Decree No. 289-99 grant of authority to the DGPCS over all research and excavation taking place in all maritime zones claimed by the Dominican Republic, is evidence of an emerging trend in international law for states dissatisfied with the "inadequacy of [the] provisions for the protection and preservation of UCH" in the LOSC to take matters into their own hands. 113 Although Kopela is correct that the Dominican government is attempting to solidify its control of this and other incredibly valuable marine resources (such as seabed oil and gas) "in line with an emerging practice in [customary] international law concerning the exercise of jurisdiction over archaeological and historical objects found on the CS [Continental Shelf] and in the EEZ," 114 this is not convincing evidence that the Dominican Republic will soon ratify the 2001 Convention. 115 The 2001 Convention provides that it will be implemented consistently with the LOSC-so the assertion of coastal state jurisdiction under the 2001 Convention is still limited to twenty-four nm. Jurisdiction beyond that in the EEZ and on the Continental Shelf would be based on the consent or agreement between parties and would therefore not provide a basis for enforcement against foreign flagged vessels and nationals not parties to the 2001 Convention. 116 Instead, the archipelagic claim and corresponding expansion of maritime zones should be viewed as a way to gain or solidify jurisdiction and control over activities directed at seabed resources (including UCH) that may interfere with or trigger coastal state jurisdiction over natural resources. While there is no indication that the Dominican Republic's action involves assertion of rights of ownership or lack of respect for the foreign sovereign immunity of other countries-such as Spain, who was the original owner of many of these wrecks and may still own them if not abandoned-the law does not seem to be a precursor to signing an agreement (i.e., the 2001 Convention) that would require the Dominican Republic to consult with other nations that may have an interest, including the wreck's original owner. 117 That being said, Dominican politics are notoriously unpredictable, and a future Dominican administration could decide that becoming a State Party to the 2001 Convention would further its goals. 118 Nevertheless, even if the Dominican Republic did accept or ratify the 2001 Convention, its government (and people) would still face the same temptation, due to lack of funding and infrastructure, to give concessions to treasure hunters under the guise of outsourcing management.
See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
116. 2001 Convention, supra note 5, art. 3. Additionally, the 2001 Convention's provisions on how parties cooperate to protect UCH on the CS are not an extension of coastal state jurisdiction over UCH, but rather an agreement between parties on how to cooperate in the protection of UCH in that area: a coastal state may take the lead on protecting UCH recognizing that when the flag state of the UCH is determined, it may take over the lead. See id., art. 10(3)(b).
117. See id., art. 10 ("Where there is a discovery of underwater cultural heritage or it is intended that activity shall be directed at underwater cultural heritage in a State Party's exclusive economic zone or on its continental shelf, that State Party shall: (a) consult all other States Parties which have declared an interest under Article 9, paragraph 5, on how best to protect the underwater cultural heritage[ ]"). However, all nations already have a duty to protect UCH and cooperate with each other for that purpose under Art 303(1) of the LOSC, so it may be argued that nations party to the LOSC already have a duty to consult with the flag state of the vessel as well as owner of cargo and others with an interest.
118. See AMB Country Risk Report Dominican Republic, A.M. BEST, 1, 4 (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www3.ambest.com/ratings/cr/reports/dominicanrepublic.pdf. My personal experience with the unpredictability of the Dominican political system is derived from the over two years I lived and worked there as a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer.
B. A Critique of Increasing State Ownership of UCH and Funding Its Management Through the Sale of Artifacts in the Dominican Republic
As evidenced by its suite of laws and international agreements, the Dominican government appears to be rigidly controlling its UCH and harmonizing its treatment of cultural property with international norms. However, the actual excavation and disposition of the artifacts evidences the denationalizing effects of globalization. Similar to resource extraction and manufacturing, the increasingly strict regulations on the exploitation of UCH in the developed world have pushed treasure hunters to certain areas of the global south that are both rich in maritime history and host to amenable regimes. 119 A quick Internet search can provide anyone with a little cash and a desire to own a piece of history with the opportunity to not only buy artifacts from Dominican waters, but also to invest in a treasure-hunting expedition. 120 A large portion of the one-quarter division of the artifacts given by the Dominican government to the treasure-hunting company Anchor Research & Salvage from the Pewter Wreck, a 450-year-old Spanish merchant vessel that sank near Punta Cana off the eastern shore of the Dominican Republic, was sold at auction in the United Kingdom on November 24, 2013. 121 The Dominican government is clearly allowing foreign treasure hunters to exploit the loopholes in its protective regime; however, this is more of an attempt to have at least some control over the disposition of its heritage rather than evidence of outright avarice. In leasing out segments of its coastline to treasurehunting companies, the DGPCS has implemented an unsustainable type of Individual Transferrable Quota as a last-ditch effort to manage its UCH. The Dominican situation-an official policy of centralized state power with relative anarchy roiling underneath-demonstrates that strategies recommending the funding of UCH management in developing countries through revenue sharing with salvors 123 or the sale of artifacts deemed archaeologically unimportant 124 perpetuate the problem. Even though treasure hunters are only permitted to excavate in their respective concessions, the Dominican government is notoriously either unable or unwilling to regulate on-the-ground activity, even within officially protected areas. 125 Treasure hunters have even used explosives to recover artifacts in the Dominican Republic's Silver Banks humpback whale sanctuary, the sister sanctuary to the U.S. Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary. 126 Furthermore, unfettered state ownership of UCH (as opposed to stewardship, which would not include the right to sell) can be actively destructive in a country with pervasive government corruption like the Dominican Republic. 127 Even if artifacts were sold after only the most exhaustive, academically rigorous, and environmentally responsible excavation, there is little chance that the money from that sale would benefit either the community abutting the waters from where the artifact was taken, or even the Dominican State as a whole.
This proliferation of the consolidation of state power over UCH combined with outsourcing to commercial salvors is disastrous for developing nations, not only because of the irretrievable loss of cultural and historical data, but also because of the ensuing environmental and economic destruction. Historic shipwrecks-particularly wrecks in shallow, warm water-provide excellent substrate for critically threatened coral reefs. 128 This is yet another example of how commercial exploitation of UCH through salvage-based companies is a poor solution for the Dominican cultural patrimony. Contrary to Vadi's, Bederman's, and the Odyssey team's assertions, historic shipwrecks are usually not in environmental marine peril and thus needing "rescue" to protect the wreck's educational value. 129 Shipwrecks stabilize over time, slowly becoming incorporated into the seabed and covered in a protective layer of hard material and marine life through a process known as concretion. 130 Excavating shipwrecks almost inevitably causes the destruction of biological resources and should therefore be undertaken only when excavation is absolutely necessary to extract knowledge from or protect the wreck, and only by parties that have the time and expertise to mitigate these harms. 131 Furthermore, the loss of environmental resources inevitably causes the loss of economic resources in the Caribbean context. Underwater archaeology pioneer Peter Throckmorton warned over a decade ago that "American treasure hunting is destroying scant resources of desperately 129. See Vadi, supra note 7, at 898 (stating erroneously the belief shipwrecks are at risk of destruction by tides; however, her assertion that human activities pose a great threat to UCH is unequivocally correct).
130. See INDIANA UNIVERSITY UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY TECHNIQUES TRAINING BOOKLET, supra note 14, at 21-22 (illustrating how wrecks become stabilized due to incorporation into the seabed over time); see also id. at 29 (defining concretion as "a composite crust of marine minerals, corrosion products, sediments, and natural life that eventually coats the most metal artifacts and some organic items deposited in the sea").
131. See generally supra note 9 (arguing that commercial salvors cannot give this level of care due to the financial pressures of their economic model).
poor emerging Caribbean nations." 132 Throckmorton stated that with the decline of agricultural and other resource exports from the Caribbean, "tourism is rapidly becoming the treasure of the Caribbean," and treasure hunting robs these developing countries of that opportunity. 133 Moreover, the sun-and-sand tourism that has long dominated the Dominican economy, requiring intensive coastal development and causing tremendous environmental degradation, cannot guarantee indefinite profit any more than the one-shot sale of an artifact. 134 Treasure-hunting companies are not unresponsive to these criticisms, and are very aware that they operate in the Dominican Republic only at the pleasure of the Dominican government. Similar to alleged greenwashing by various multinational energy companies, some treasure-hunting companies seem to have been influenced by growing global concern over cultural heritage and have gone to great lengths to sanitize their images. Anchor Research & Salvage, the company permitted to work the Pewter Wreck, has partnered with the Punta Cana Foundation, 135 which-ironically-also funds coral reef conservation efforts in partnership with the University of Miami. 136 Since treasure-hunting companies at least seem to fear the conservationist leanings of the Dominican government, there is hope that the Dominican Republic could be open to a different model, provided that another nonstate (i.e., something the Dominican government would not have to pay for) actor could fill the treasure hunter's role in the Dominican UCH management scheme. Clearly, due to the overwhelming pressure on poorer countries to capitalize on their resources as expeditiously as possible, another method that allows developing states to sustainably utilize these resources with little of their own financial input must be developed. SALVAGE STORM
III. PROFIT WITHOUT PLUNDER
The ongoing exploitation of UCH in developing countries like the Dominican Republic that profess their intent to protect it, and the obvious problems with artifact sale even after the most environmentally and ethically responsible excavation, illustrate that purely state-centric approaches are inappropriate to the globalized world in which developing nations and their resource managers (or exploiters) operate. The Dominican government officially maintains complete control over the recovery of UCH, yet this regulatory structure has ultimately led to unsustainable exploitation rather than the use of the resource for the benefit of all Dominicans. Furthermore, the Dominican government cannot suddenly begin to manage its UCH and associated natural resources in a way that the overarching international consensus for conservation would deem acceptable, even if it became a party to the 2001 Convention. The funding and technical skills simply do not exist within the state, nor can preservationists hope for a generation of professionally trained Dominican archaeologists to appear overnight. Likewise, the Dominican Republic has already found a way to capitalize on this resource through a function of globalization: specifically the ability-even of a state-to look outside of one's own borders for money and expertise absent at home. The Dominican resource management agencies are accustomed to foreign, nongovernmental participation in their activities (if not always happy about it); therefore, attempting to dismantle the general framework of these public-private and domesticforeign relationships would be counterproductive. 137 Instead, it is more efficient to reframe these relationships using Indiana University's Living Museums in the Sea model as implemented through two other strategies for resource management in the globalized world: Ostromian Common-Pool Resource Management Theory and Multilevel Environmental Governance.
137. See Holmes, supra note 125, at 639 (Although foreign NGOs like the Nature Conservancy are extremely active in the Dominican Republic, "[t]he Nature Conservancy faces strong resistance from Dominican NGOs, the state and the media, who are very strongly opposed to its involvement in protected areas administration. This is based on a form of anti-US sentiment, part of wider Dominican opposition to US ownership of land: giving a US NGO a role in running a protected area is seen as a damaging attack on sovereignty").
A. The Living Museums in the Sea Model
Living Museums in the Sea is a multi-resource, sustainable management strategy developed by the Indiana University Office of Underwater Science. Inspired by the U.S. Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National Marine Sanctuary program, the Living Museums model protects UCH and the associated marine life by creating marine protected areas around the UCH site. 138 Artifacts and their associated biology are predominately left in situ (when appropriate, thus avoiding the need for expensive conservation techniques), 139 and professional archaeologists provide interpretive materials and train Dominicans as guides and park managers. 140 These no-take, no-anchor zones can provide a consistent source of income (as opposed to the one-time gain from an artifact sale, which usually goes directly to the government and not the community from which the artifact was taken) from tourism and off-site fishing. 141 Indiana University has already established three of these Living Museums on the south coast of the Dominican Republic without requiring the Dominican government to significantly alter the way it delegates management authority in the globalized context. 142 Indiana University or other qualified noncommercial research and conservation programs assisting communities to implement the LMS model can replace treasure hunters as the specialist third parties to which the Dominican government delegates some of its management and 139. See Michael McCarthy, Museums and Maritime Archaeology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MARITIME ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 9, at 1050-51 (stating that although in situ preservation should be considered as the primary option at any site, and that postexcavation conservation is "maritime archaeology's greatest hidden cost," artifact recovery must still be left open as an option when necessary due to threats to the artifact or the potential for significant scholarly benefit).
140. See Hanselmann & Beeker, supra note 138. 141. Although fishing is not permitted within most marine protected areas, and never directly on the wreck site due to the danger of damage from fishing equipment, UCH serves as a fish-aggregating device that increases the population of fish in the general vicinity. UCH often fits the classic Ostromian model of a common-pool resource (CPR). It is characterized by high subtractability (removing artifacts from a shipwreck subtracts from the benefits that other users could gain from the site, from the artifacts as both cultural objects and substrate for marine life) and difficult exclusion (the inherently ephemeral and difficult-to-control nature of marine boundaries). 143 As a result of decades of empirical field studies, Ostrom found that "no single type of property regime [open access, group, individual, or government] works efficiently, fairly, and sustainably in relation to all CPRs[, and] CPR problems continue to exist in many regulated settings," case in point: Dominican government owned-and-managed UCH. 144 Instead, Ostrom identified seven principles common to successful, long-enduring CPR institutions, and an eighth unique to CPRs that are part of larger systems. 145 Although Ostrom did not apply her factors directly to the challenge of archaeological resource management, there is precedent for treating cultural property as a type of CPR. Scholar Yan Zhang recommends using the Ostromian model to supplement management of terrestrial cultural resources in response to the shortcomings of privatization, state intervention, and international intervention. 146 Treating a resource as simultaneously cultural and natural is not completely novel in the scholarly literature either. Professor Pammela Quinn Saunders suggested treating the natural resource rights of Maine lobstermen, which are managed as CPRs, as a form of cultural property to gain increased domestic and international legal recognition of their fishing practices as a property right. 147 Yet, managing shipwrecks as both a cultural and natural resource is further complicated-particularly in the Dominican context-by the lack of a tradition of community management (of UCH) that typically characterizes successful CPR regimes. 148 The development of a CPR management program in the Dominican context must therefore occur in a bi-directional way. Instead of external authorities harmonizing with organically created local property-management regimes to afford them legal protection, the Dominican model will involve communities appropriating and retooling foreign CPR-management strategies and the Dominican government altering, or at least reinterpreting, its national cultural resource legislation in response.
Applying Ostrom's first seven principles for successful CPR management to the Dominican natural and social landscape illustrates the particular advantages and challenges of creating this bi-directional CPR, and how the LMS model can help resolve these issues. 149 Several of the principles should be considered together when they are helped and hindered by the same characteristics of the Dominican context and the LMS framework. The eighth factor will be addressed in the next section as a type of Multilevel Environmental Governance. At this point, it is important to reiterate that Living Museums envisions CPR as a tool for management rather than ownership of UCH. In accordance with both existing Dominican legislation and the overwhelming international consensus, the Dominican government would remain the ultimate owner of state-owned or abandoned UCH, with Dominican community members owning and managing access rights to the sites. 150 
Principle 1: Clearly Defined Boundaries for Both the CPR and Those Who Have the Right to Use It; and Principle 2: Appropriation and Provision Rules Are Appropriate to the Local Conditions
Marine protected areas are notoriously difficult to govern, even in developed countries with well-funded management agencies and strong financial commitments to marine resource management. 151 Recognizing the utter impossibility of policing large areas of the ocean, the Living Museums concept requires resource managers to control only the area immediately surrounding the shipwreck or other UCH. 152 Similar to the highly successful Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary shipwreck trail, sites are designated with easily made marker buoys, and site managers maintain a system of mooring buoys so vessels carrying divers and snorkelers do not have to throw anchor and damage the site. 153 Boundaries are, of course, only as good as the number of people who know about and respect them; therefore, community managers will have to network with the Dominican government to ensure that these areas are marked on nautical charts and to assist with compliance and enforcement.
Developing rules appropriate to the milieu for the use of shipwreck resources will involve a complicated dance among tour guides, fishermen, and archaeologists. These three groups of stakeholders are simultaneously in conflict with, yet dependent on, each other for longterm success. LMS sites cannot be created without the expertise-both for excavation and interpretation-of professional archaeologists and parks specialists to interpret the UCH and give it a sustainable monetary value as a unique tourist attraction. Archaeologists depend on tour guides and fishermen to abide by park rules so the sites retain their archaeological integrity. Tour guides require fishermen to abstain from fishing directly on the site to prevent harm to tourists from hooks, lines, and nets. Tour guides also prevent tourists from taking the marine life, which is one of the primary reasons why tourists dive in the first place. Archaeologists need tour guides to prevent tourists from taking artifacts and thereby destroying habitats. Appropriation and provision (which, in this case means site maintenance) of rights and duties must be structured to overcome the inevitably high transaction costs of consensus-building and compliance among different nationalities and professional classes. This will need to be accomplished through smaller, profession-specific CPRs to manage tour-boat access to sites and nearby, off-site fishing. 154 Although logistically the simplest of the seven factors to implement, ensuring the rights of participation of Dominican community members and gaining the permission and recognition from the Dominican government as the resource managers with the absolutely critical right to exclude are the most politically challenging. The Dominican government has a long history of, although effective, relatively autocratic conservation strategies. 156 Furthermore, the increasing economic reliance on tourism, which the LMS model would help advance, poses significant distributional justice problems if it continues to be executed using the traditional, elite-run model. 157 The Dominican government explicitly stated that tourism development "is the highest priority of the Dominican State as an adequate measure for the advance of economic progress in the country," 158 and there is no guarantee that increased tourism will benefit the wider Dominican populace or be any less environmentally destructive than the current all-inclusive resort model. 159 tourism combined with the inherent complexity of managing marine resources described in Principles 1 and 2 could actually force the development and adoption of Principles 3 and 7. As the international tourism market moves away from the traditional sun-and-sand model, the Dominican government increasingly looks to ecotourism as the solution. 160 While this model threatens to perpetuate the antidemocratic legacy of the Dominican conservation movement in terrestrial sites, the inherently chaotic nature of the marine space will require a much more decentralized, and hopefully more democratic, management structure. 161 3. As already detailed in Part II, the Dominican Republic is unfortunately, and deservedly, reputed for its incredibly high level of corruption. 162 However, the Dominican Republic also has a tradition of local organization springing up to take the place of dysfunctional or completely absent governmental action, even for notoriously difficult-tomanage marine resources. 163 These independent, nongovernmental resource management strategies can also blossom into international partnerships. In the Samaná Bay region, an international NGO (the Washington, D.C. based Centre for Marine Conservation) implemented a collaborative coastal management program with no assistance or even recognition from the Dominican government. 164 Unfortunately, this project has faced difficulties due to the lack of legitimization of local control from the Dominican government, illustrating the importance of Ostrom's seventh principle. 165 Although Ostrom states that enforcement mechanisms must be internal to the CPR-appropriator group, 166 this principle must be implemented in a more flexible way given both the multinational character of UCH appropriators and the different aspects of the resource that they appropriate. Renewable resource takings disputes should ideally happen at the community level to reduce transaction costs and the opportunity for corruption to influence outcomes. The severity of the penalty could vary based on the relative nonrenewability of the resource. For example, fishing above one's quota, fishing at the wrong times, bringing divers to the site out of turn, or bringing too many divers to a site could result in an inconvenient but relatively minor sanction, while taking a slow-growing coral or sponge or repeat offenses could result in more severe penalties such as large fines, suspensions, and public opprobrium.
However, in a departure from traditional CPR-management theory, the unauthorized taking of the nonrenewable resource (the artifacts) must be resolved at the national level, as this type of infraction is often only discovered when the malfeasor attempts to take the artifact out of the country. 167 Fortunately, there is already a strong international framework in place to deter the illicit trade in artifacts. 168 The impetus is therefore on the Dominican government to declare and enforce all forprofit removal of artifacts as illegal, thereby subjecting treasure hunting to the hammers of national customs laws.
C. No Justice, No Sustainability: Fulfilling Ostrom's Eighth Principle Through Multilevel Environmental Governance
Ostrom's eighth principle of successful CPR institutions states that, for CPRs that are a part of larger systems, "governance activities [must be] organized in multiple layers of nested enterprise." 169 Although an individual shipwreck and the coral growing on it may only cover a few square meters of the sea floor, its stakeholders range from the local tour guide bringing his clients to the dive site to the fisherman working miles away whose catch spawned on the wreck, all the way to the upper echelons of the Dominican Ministries of Culture and Environment and the multitude of foreign tourists, would-be treasure hunters, scholars, and concerned governments. As Ostrom stated, "[e]stablishing rules at one level, without rules at the other levels, will produce an incomplete system that may not endure over the long run." 170 Scholar Tun Myint echoed this concern in his study of multinational, polycentric river system governance, stating that to ensure successful implementation of local, national, and transnational (i.e., multilevel) environmental governance, nonstate actors must "cooperate and comply with transnational legal and policy arrangements at the local layer. . . ." 171 In Myint's view, a critical aspect of creating successful multilevel governance is identifying "sources of legitimacy for these nonstate actors . . . to be equal partners in the transnational layer of governance." 172 Thus, it is not enough to implement a CPR management strategy. CPR management through LMS must be thought of as a type of Multilevel Environmental Governance due to the extreme power inequalities among the multitude of stakeholders.
As stated in the previous section, enforcement mechanisms are always internal to the user group in all successful CPR systems. 173 Yet, as the user groups in the Dominican context become more internationalized due to the influx of tourism development and dollars, the resource monitors and users risk becoming less accountable to one another. The LMS model, as it inherently relies on tourism as an incentive mechanism to protect UCH, must ensure that it is not complicit in the continued disenfranchisement of Dominicans from their natural resource access rights. 174 The LMS model as a tool of Multilevel Environmental Governance (MLEG) has the potential to provide this source of legitimacy for Dominican nonstate actors so they can hold their own against governmental and foreign private entities. MLEG, defined as "nested levels of jurisdictions or the organisation of governance functions at several spatial scales simultaneously," 175 helps overcome collective action problems in large, multi-layered systems by keeping the primary actor groups at each level small. For example, one Dominican fisherman who does not want a shipwreck that is his primary fishing ground to be looted has no chance going up against wealthy United States-based companies and their allies in the Dominican government, nor even his fellow fishermen if they see they can make a short-term profit by selling the location of the wreck to a treasure hunter. But, if he is part of a formalized local group that governs an aspect of the resource through Ostromian CPR with the recognition of the Dominican government, he can gain the legitimacy to participate in the global decision making. Fortunately, the Dominican legislation governing UCH already recognizes third-party managers through the same concession rights that currently allow treasure hunters to plunder Dominican waters. 176 Therefore, it should not require significant legislative reform to substitute one manager (community members and their international partners) for another.
CONCLUSION
Unless a transnational, globalization-appropriate solution like the Living Museums in the Sea is proven to be a successful CPR management model, the Dominican model of "Command, Control, and Cash In" will increasingly appeal to lesser-developed countries as cultural protection laws harmonize in the "developed" world. Yet, in this era of austerity, we can expect all governments-both of developed and developing countries-to increase the horizontal outsourcing of their responsibilities to nonstate actors, not always for the public benefit. Community-based management of our underwater heritage is consequently imperative for the sustainable use of UCH for all mankind. 176. See Decreto No. 289-99, supra note 99, Art. 5 ("execute its program of study, salvage, conservation, and enhancement of artifacts through third-party concessions") (author's translation).
